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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
10-3703 
_______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
v. 
 
JORGE L. DAVILA, 
                                  Appellant 
        
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 1-09-cr-00343-001) 
District Judge: Hon. William W. Caldwell 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 21, 2011 
 
BEFORE: BARRY, AMBRO and COWEN , Circuit Judges 
 
 (Filed: June 30, 2011) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
   Jorge L. Davila appeals from the criminal judgment entered by the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  We will affirm, without prejudice 
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to Davila’s right to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a properly filed 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 motion. 
I. 
 On October 21, 2009, Davila was indicted on one count of manufacturing, 
distributing, and possessing with the intent to manufacture and distribute more than 50 
grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.  On April 
8, 2010, a superseding information was filed, charging him with one count of 
manufacturing, distributing, and possessing with the intent to manufacture and distribute 
(an unspecified amount of) cocaine base.   
Davila entered a plea agreement, and he pled guilty to the superseding information 
on April 12, 2010.  Pursuant to this agreement, he was to be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of 96 months.  A presentence report was then submitted on August 19, 
2010.  It calculated a base offense level of 28 (based on the 41.5 grams of cocaine base 
that was found on Davila’s person), a total offense level of 25, and a criminal history 
category of IV, resulting in a Guideline range of 84 to 105 months.   
On August 26, 2010, the District Court accepted the plea agreement.  A sentencing 
hearing was then conducted on September 1, 2010.  At this hearing, Davila questioned his 
counsel’s performance, claiming, inter alia, that he had been led to believe that his base 
offense level was 32 and that his attorney never told him that he “was at a Level 28.”  
(AA28.)  The District Court then gave him time to speak with his attorney.  Following a 
recess, Davila indicated that he did not wish to withdraw his guilty plea but did “want to 
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file ineffective counsel.”  (AA29.)  The District Court sentenced Davila to 96 months of 
imprisonment.   
II. 
 In this direct criminal appeal,
1
 Davila claims that his prior attorney provided 
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel by failing:  (1) “to clearly instruct him 
regarding his Total Offense Level and the guideline range of incarceration to which he 
would be exposed;” and (2) to negotiate a sentence incorporating “the soon-to-be 
implemented changes” for crack cocaine cases.  (Appellant’s Brief at 10.).  Nevertheless, 
his ineffectiveness claims are premature.   
 A collateral proceeding usually constitutes the preferred mechanism for litigating 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  Accordingly, “[w]e have repeatedly expressed 
our strong preference for reviewing allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel in 
collateral proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 rather than on direct appeal.”  United 
States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 312 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Gov’t of V.I. v. Forte, 806 
F.2d 73, 77-78 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 950 (3d Cir. 
1986)).  Such claims often involve allegations and evidence that are either absent from, or 
not readily apparent in, the record on appeal.  See, e.g., id.  Likewise, the Supreme Court 
has observed that the district court generally constitutes “the forum best suited to 
developing the facts necessary to determining the adequacy of representation.”  Massaro 
v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 (2003).    
                                                 
1
 The District Court possessed subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
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The government acknowledges that an exception exists “[w]here the record is 
sufficient to allow determination of ineffective assistance of counsel.”  United States v. 
Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Gov’t of V.I. v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 
133 (3d Cir. 1984)).  However, it further points out that this exception is not satisfied in 
the present circumstances.  It appears uncontested that the current record is largely silent 
regarding, among other things, the prior counsel’s specific reasons for negotiating the 
plea, the additional penalties to which Davila would have been exposed if he had been 
found guilty of the charge in the original indictment, and what exactly was said by Davila 
and his prior attorney during the recess at the sentencing hearing.  At this stage, this Court 
has, as the government observes, “no way of knowing whether a seemingly unusual or 
misguided action by counsel had a sound strategic motive or was taken because the 
counsel’s alternatives were even worse.”  Massaro, 538 U.S. at 505 (citation omitted). 
III. 
 We will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the District 
Court.  As the government requests, we will do so without prejudice to Davila’s right to 
raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a properly filed § 2255 motion. 
                                                                                                                                                             
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).    
